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Abstract 
How has financial globalisation changed the nature of external vulnerability of emerging 
economies? To answer this question, we first present an overview of the changes in 
international capital flows and cross-border stocks involving emerging economies from 
the 1970s to the COVID-19 crisis, and then identify relevant recent shifts in financial 
globalisation. We link the concepts of financialisation, subordinated financial integration 
and currency hierarchy, extending the latter to consider the most recent features of 
financial globalisation. To better understand the metamorphosis of these economies’ 
vulnerabilities, we deploy a stylised balance sheet analysis. We find the occurrence of 
the phenomenon of ‘original sin’ during financial internationalisation, while in more 
recent times of financial globalisation the diversification of financial flows and investors, 
and the increase of securities denominated in domestic currency have created 
additional channels of vulnerability, labelled as ‘original sin redux’. We call for capital 
account regulation targeting these new complex vulnerabilities.  
 
Keywords: external vulnerability; currency hierarchy; subordinated financial 
integration; financial globalisation; emerging markets economies 
JEL Classification: F32; F34; F62 
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1 Introduction 
The current economic and financial COVID-19 crisis has brought special hardship to 
most emerging market economies (EMEs)2. They have been suffering – as it happened at 
the global level – from local lockdown measures and the interruption of global value 
chains, while they were especially hit by capital outflows never seen before.   
This unprecedented pro-cyclical response of global financial investors certainly relates to 
the new level and form of integration into financial globalisation. Here, we are confronted 
with a complex picture: on the one hand, we observe a wave of external debt accumulation 
during the 2010s (World Bank, 2020), while at the same time most EMEs have 
accumulated high levels of foreign exchange reserves, and – to different degrees – the 
share of those investors’ assets denominated in EMEs domestic currency has increased. 
This new wave of instability places the new configurations of external vulnerability under 
the spotlight.  
Financial globalisation is subject to fierce debate. Here, we draw on strands of critical 
discussion that emphasise the inherent instability of capital flows (i.e. Stiglitz and 
Ocampo, 2008). Especially relevant for the case of EMEs are concepts that consider the 
asymmetric nature of financialisation and financial globalisation, such as subordinated 
financial integration (Kaltenbrunner and Paincera, 2017; Bonizzi et al., 2019), and the 
centre-periphery configuration of the international monetary system, such as the concept 
of currency hierarchy (Paula et al. 2017; Fritz et al. 2018; see also Andrade and Prates, 
2014).  
Departing from the perspective of an asymmetric and subordinated integration of EMEs 
into financial globalisation, we ask how we can understand and systematically depict the 
new patterns of external vulnerability of EMEs and its implications in terms of risks? 
What is the metamorphosis of this vulnerability along the different phases of financial 
 
2 Here we define EMEs as peripheral countries that have engaged in financial globalisation. We will use 
EMEs and emerging economies as synonyms. 
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globalisation? Our main hypothesis is that vulnerability overall has not decreased, but 
rather it has changed its nature and the channels through which it affects EMEs. 
The paper is divided in five sections. Section 2 provides an overview of the changes of 
financial flows to EMEs, together with a periodisation for the regimes of financial 
internationalisation and globalisation from the 1970s to today. Section 3 establishes the 
relationship between the concepts of subordinated financial integration and currency 
hierarchy. Section 4 provides a synthetic balance sheet analysis for these different regimes 
to systematically assess the metamorphosis of external vulnerability that EMEs have been 
going through since then. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
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2 New patterns of capital flows and cross-border 
stocks involving EMEs 
2.1 Overall picture: Ever greater volumes, diversified channels and 
actors  
Since the mid-1990s, there has been a remarkable and steady expansion in cross-border 
global capital flows in the world and consequently of cross-border stocks. EMEs still 
account for a small, albeit growing share of these stocks (Figure 1). However, despite the 
residual nature of capital flows directed to these economies, their potentially destabilising 
effects on their financial markets and exchange rates are significant, since the volume 
allocated by global investors is not marginal in relation to the size of these markets. This 
financial asymmetry stems from that fact that international financial integration takes 
place between ‘unequal partners’ (Studart, 2006).   
Figure 1. Global external assets (left) and external liabilities (right)* (US$ billion) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017). 
Note: (*) Major EMEs: Argentina, Brazil, China, Indonesia, India, Mexico, Poland, Thailand, Turkey and 
Russia; Major AEs: Australia, Canada, Euro Area, Japan, Korea, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United 
States and Taiwan 
 
The value of EMEs’ gross foreign assets and liabilities has significantly increased in 
absolute terms, and to a lesser extent as a proportion of GDP, being accompanied by 
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significant changes in the structure of external balance sheets (Figure 2). The 
unprecedented increase in foreign reserves – as a form of self-insurance to prevent a 
sudden reversal of speculative capital flows in EMEs – is the largest change on the asset 
side (more than 50% of total assets on average in 2004-2015, according to our calculations 
using data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2017). Foreign exchange reserve accumulation 
mostly originates from capital inflows, while only in a few countries is this the result of 
cumulative current account surpluses. At the same time, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
increased from 3.5% of GDP in 2000 to 7.8% in 2007 (17% of the total assets), thanks to 
the emergence of transnational firms in major EMEs such as Brazil, China, India, and 
Turkey. On the liability side, where the composition has been more diversified, the share 
of both FDI and equity portfolio has grown at the expense of other investments (where 
private external debt has been growing faster than public external debt), reducing their 
share from 45% in 1999 to 25.2% in 2015. 
 









Source: Authors’ elaboration with data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017). 
Note: see Figure 1 
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Figure 3 shows the net external position of EMEs (without China, and only China): the 
composition of the net position is more or less similar, as both have a predominance of 
foreign reserves and FDI (which is still negative for both despite its growing participation 
in external assets). Only China has been a net creditor since 2000 due to its enormous 
foreign reserve accumulation, enabled by the combination of a currency account surplus 
and large FDI, while other EMEs have been net debtors (Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Net external position: Major EMEs* (without China, left) and China (right) – as 
percentage of GDP) – 1995-2015 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017). 
(*) Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, India, Mexico, Poland, Thailand, Turkey and Russia. 
Note: Net external position = external assets minus external liabilities 
 
Another new trend in the composition of several EMEs’ external liability in the 2000s is 
the increasing proportion of public debt, denominated in domestic currency, held by non-
residents. This is the case in most EMEs, accounting for more than 25% of total in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Russia, South Africa and Turkey in 2013, 
according to Akyüz (2015, p. 41). A similar pattern has evolved in non-resident holdings 
in stock markets as a percentage of market capitalisation (Table 1).  
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Table 1. Non-resident holdings in stock markets (% of market capitalisation) 
Country 2001 2007 2012 
Argentina 1.4 5.7 8.2 
Brazil 18.2 21.2 23.4 
China 2.5 6.6 13.5 
India 12.1 18.1 19.8 
Indonesia 15.6 19.0 19.9 
Malasya 10.5 20.8 17.0 
Mexico 32.2 29.9 22.1 
Phillippines 8.3 18.5 10.8 
Russia 14.4 12.4 16.7 
South Africa 9.3 10.2 19.7 
Thailand 27.8 29.0 27.0 
Turkey 9.4 17.0 20.2 
Source: Azyuz (2015, p.22), World Bank WDI and IMF  
 
The structural changes in the composition of cross-border holdings have amplified the 
susceptibility of gross external assets and liabilities and net foreign asset positions to 
variations in asset prices and exchange rates, entailing large transfers of wealth between 
EMEs and advanced economies (AEs). According to UNCTAD’s (2019) estimates, in the 
2000-2018 period the ensuing resource transfer from sixteen major EMEs amounted on 
average to roughly US$ 440 billion per year or 2.2% of these countries’ GDP, as a result 
of return differentials between safe external assets held to insure against risky external 
liabilities. Table 2 shows that the total returns of AEs were positive over 2000-2016, due 
to both the yield on gross assets and gross liabilities and the capital gains from changes 
in asset prices and exchange rates, while both were negative for EMEs. Hence, the EMEs 
negative returns on net international investment stems from not only the greater external 
liabilities than external assets for most countries, but also from the lower returns of their 
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Table 2. Returns, yields and capital gains and losses of EMEs and AEs (percentage) 
  Yield* Capital gains/Losses** Total returns*** 
  Assets Liabilities Differential Assets Liabilities Total Assets Liabilities Differential 
2000-2016              
EMEs 3.1 5.7 -2.6 -1.0 -1.7 -2.7 2.1 7.4 -5.3 
AEs 3.5 2.7 0.8 2.1 -1.3 0.8 5.6 4.0 1.6 
2000-2007              
EMEs 3.3 5.9 -2.6 1.3 -5.3 -4.0 4.6 11.2 -6.6 
AEs 4.3 3.4 0.9 4.9 -2.8 2.1 9.2 6.2 3.0 
2008-2016              
EMEs 3.0 5.4 -2.4 -3.1 1.4 -1.7 -0.1 4.0 -4.1 
AEs 2.8 2.0 0.8 -0.5 -0.1 -0.6 2.3 2.1 0.2 
Source: Akyüz (2019, p. 66).        
Note: (*)    Yields (dollar rates) on gross assets and on gross liabilities    
           (**)   Capital gains and losses result from changes in assets prices and exchange rates 
           (***) Sum of yield and capital gains/losses      
 
 
2.2 Financial internationalisation and globalisation: A periodisation of 
capital flow cycles to EMEs  
The increasing volume of capital flows to EMEs and the resulting changes in the 
dimension and composition of their external liabilities and assets, as described above – 
together with the diversification of financial instruments and investors – has led to a 
growing internationalisation of finance in EMEs. This in turn is part of a broader global 
regime shift.  
Regulationist economists (i.e. Guttman, 2016) define this new regime as “finance-led 
capitalism”. Its most important feature is the process of financialisation, broadly 
understood as a "pattern of accumulation in which profit making occurs increasingly 
through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production" 
(Krippner, 2005, p. 173; see also Fontana et al., 2019). Financial globalisation – defined 
as the interpenetration of national financial markets, as well as their integration in the 
international financial market (Chesnais, 1996, pp. 10-11) – is seen as one of the main 
drivers of ‘finance-led capitalism’ and financialisation.  
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Part of the mainstream literature sustains that this new era of financial globalisation 
promises more stability to the world economy due to a greater share of less volatile FDI 
and equity flows, even if volatile capital flows bring the risk of financial contagion 
(McKinsey, 2017). Against this, we argue in this paper that these structural changes have 
created new transmission channels of financial shocks through international capital flows 
and new sources of external vulnerability to EMEs (see section 4). 
We can divide the boom-bust cycles of capital flows to EMEs into two main phases of 
financial internationalisation (1970s and 1980s) and financial globalisation (1990s to 
present). Financial internationalisation began in the 1970s with the increase in 
international commercial lending (mainly from “Eurodollar” markets), driven by a rapid 
expansion of international liquidity associated with oil surpluses and growing US external 
deficits, and it ended with an external debt crisis in Latin America in the 1980s3. The 
second period, financial globalisation, was triggered in the early-1990s by the rapid 
increase in liquidity and the huge decline in interest rates in the US and Japan, followed 
by a sovereign debt restructuring in Latin America and the capital account liberalisation 
of many EMEs.  
Taking a closer look at the unfolding of financial globalisation and its impact in EMEs, 
we can identify three main sub-periods, the first of which started at the beginning of the 
1990s and ended with a sequence of financial crises in Latin America, East Asia and 
Russia at the end of that decade. The second wave began with the new millennium, 
coming to an abrupt halt in 2008 with the GFC. Triggered by aggressive policies of 
quantitative easing by AEs central banks, a third cycle of financial globalisation started, 
with ever greater and diversified capital flows to EMEs. The inherent volatility of these 
 
3 The contraction of world trade in 1981 caused the prices of primary resources (Latin America's largest 
export) to fall. Considering the balance of payments of indebted countries due the effect of interest rate 
shocks on the stock of external debt, a handful of countries eventually became – using Minsky’s (1986) 
taxonomy – Ponzi, namely they had to borrow to pay the debt service, in a situation that causes debt to 
escalate.   
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flows reached its peak in the months immediately after the outbreak of COVID-19 and 
its related global economic crisis.4  
While debt operations (mainly bank loans) predominated during the cycle of financial 
internationalisation, the first cycle of financial globalisation began with some change in 
the composition of capital inflows, with a gradual increase in FDI. However, it is in the 
second and third capital flows’ waves of financial globalisation that major changes 
occurred. Besides the much larger total flows, their composition became more diversified, 
favoured – among others – by carry-trade operations to explore interest differentials, the 
internationalisation of global value chains, the enormous push of FDI to and from China, 
and the liberalisation of local capital markets to foreign investors (see Figure 4; for an 
overview over the different periods see also Table A1). 
 
 
4 This sequencing obviously entails regional and country-specific variation, which we cannot detail due to 
space constraints. Here, the group of so-called ‘frontier markets’ of Sub-Saharan African and other poorer 
countries in terms of per capita income (IMF, 2019) certainly represents one of the major variations. These 
only entered into financial globalisation after the 1990s or the 2000s, and to date they demonstrate a lower 
and less complex degree of global financial integration.  
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Figure 4. External liabilities of major emerging economies* – 1970-1994 (a) and 1995-2015 (b) 
(US$ billion) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017). 
Note: (i) Major emerging economies: Argentina, Brazil, China, Indonesia, India, Mexico, Poland, Thailand, 
Turkey and Russia; (ii) On the left graph: debt = other investments plus portfolio debt.  
 
 
2.3 Capital flows under COVID-19 
The COVID-19 pandemic led to the burst of the third wave of capital flows under 
financial globalisation. The high uncertainty related to the spread of the pandemic hugely 
increased fears about the future, triggering unprecedented portfolio outflows from EMEs, 
first reaching equity markets and in the sequence bond markets, resulting in deflation in 
equity prices, a sharp increase in bond spreads and abrupt currency depreciations. Net 
outflows amounted US$ 104.8 during the COVID-19 crisis, more than three times the 
US$ 33.0 billion recorded in the GFC (Figure 5). However, since April 2020, this 
movement lost momentum with the partial recovery of portfolio capital inflows to EMEs, 
which has led to prices of many assets returning close to the levels that they held prior to 
the panic sell-off (Wheatly, 2020). As central banks of major AEs have unleashed 
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unprecedented amounts of liquidity in response to the recent crisis, global investors have 
had little choice but to search yield in EMEs.  
 
Figure 5. Net portfolio outflows from selected EMEs* – US$ billion (left) and exchange rate 
(US$/local currency; 100 = 2 Jan.), January-August 2020 (right) 
 
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on IFF Daily Emerging Market Portfolio database  
(*) Selected: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar Republic of Korea, Saudi 
Arabia, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam. 
 
One determinant of the record capital outflows from EMEs during COVID-19 crisis is 
the increasing importance of benchmark-driven funds – that follow a flagship benchmark 
index with a predefined list of countries and securities with specific weights (JP Morgan 
EMBI or Morgan Stanley’s MSCI) – which are much more strongly influenced by push 
factors: the behaviour of these funds contributed to the strong correlation across asset 
managers’ portfolio decisions during the COVID-19 crisis, reinforcing the herding 
behaviour of investors that is typical in such circumstances. 
The combination of the COVID-19 crisis and the steep decline in oil prices led to sharp 
currency depreciation in EMEs between the end of February and mid/late-March 2020, 
in a trend that continued in April in some countries like Brazil, South Africa and Turkey 
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more than in others5 (Figure 4). The greater presence of foreign investors in local capital 
markets has increased the transmission of international financial shocks to these markets, 
as surges in the entry and exit of non-residents affect not only asset prices but also 
exchange rates. Indeed, huge currency depreciations have a strong impact on EMEs. First, 
as most EMEs accumulated corporate external debt prior to the COVID-19 crisis, driven 
by historically-low borrowing costs and various incentives favouring debt over equity, 
free-falling exchange rates along with a sharp rise in spreads have increased the costs to 
borrowers paying foreign currency debt (OECD, 2020). Second, the reduction of financial 
assets’ values in foreign investors’ home currency terms eventually triggered the sale of 
financial assets by non-residents, which resulted in further capital outflows (Hofmann et 
al., 2020). This latter event is related to the emergence of a new source of external 




5 Hannan (2018, p.13-14) provides a clue for understanding the different EMEs reactions to an external 
financial shock: “The more recent work shows that while the incidence of capital flow surges depends on 
external factors, whether a particular emerging market economy receives that surge depends on domestic 
factors, including the extent of financial market liberalisation and global financial market integration.” 
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3 Currency hierarchy and the subordinated financial 
integration of EMEs 
Critical discussion regarding the effects of financial globalisation on EMEs – in particular 
related to the more recent boom-bust cycles – comes from diverse strands. Especially 
relevant are the concepts of centre-periphery, currency hierarchy and subordinated 
finance, which result in global asymmetries. EMEs’ ’subordinated financial integration’ 
is the form of insertion of peripheral countries in global finance, and the way in which 
global finance and domestic economies are connected, whereby “not only is 
financialisation fundamentally shaped by EMEs subordinated position within the 
international financial economy, but also that financialisation itself cements this position 
and exacerbates uneven development” (Kaltenbrunner and Painceira, 2017, p. 304). This 
calls for a discussion about international monetary asymmetry, as EMEs that issue what 
we call peripheral currencies (i.e. currencies that are not accepted at the international 
level) have a subordinated insertion in the international monetary system (see also 
Ocampo 2001). 
In this vein, in other works (Paula et al., 2017; Fritz et al., 2018; see also Andrade and 
Prates, 2014) we have applied the structuralist concept of an asymmetric global economy 
divided into two poles – centre and periphery – to the analysis of the international 
monetary system. This approach states that currencies are hierarchically positioned 
according to their degree of liquidity, whereby the key currency (currently the US 
fiduciary dollar) is placed at the top of the hierarchy because it has the highest degree of 
liquidity. The currencies issued by the other centre (or advanced) countries/regions (such 
as the euro and yen) are in intermediate positions and they are also liquid currencies. At 
the opposite end are the currencies issued by peripheral economies, which are non-liquid 
currencies as they are incapable of performing the basic functions of money (medium of 
exchange, denomination of contracts and international reserve currency) at the 
international level.  
Indeed, with its formalisation of the liquidity premium in relation to other valuation 
attributes of assets, the concept of currency hierarchy enables more precisely capturing 
the effects of financial globalisation in EMEs, especially in the recent cycles. 
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To compensate the differences in liquidity premia between centre and periphery assets, 
less liquid currencies need to offer higher total returns to be attractive to international 
investors, such as higher interest rates and/or higher capital gains (through asset price 
and/or exchange rate appreciation) when compared with AEs’ currencies. Expressed 
formally, in the face of the lower liquidity premium (l), to make a global investor hold 
their assets, EMEs have to offer higher monetary returns (a + q) – where a is the expected 
appreciation/depreciation of the currency and q is the yield of the securities (measured by 
the interest rate) – and/or reduce the carrying cost by reducing regulation on the capital 
account (c). In equilibrium, we have: 
aN + qN – cN + lN = aS + qS – cS + lS                                                                  (1) 
where S denotes Southern or EMEs, and N denotes Northern or AEs. 
As lS < lN, this difference has to be compensated by higher returns, so that: 
 (aS + qS – cS) > (aN + qN – cN)                                                                         (2) 
Taking account of the recent changes in the composition of capital flows with the 
increasing share of portfolio debt and equity in external liabilities, we additionally 
consider the valuation variation generated by changes not only in exchange rates but also 
in asset prices (equities, bonds).  
Therefore, we extend the formal concept of currency hierarchy (formula (1)) by 
incorporating the yield differentials and assets’ capital gains/losses, so that: 
lS < lN => (ac;S + aa;S + qr;S + qy,S – cS) > (ac:N + aa;N + qr;N + qy,N – cN)      (3) 
where ac is currency appreciation/depreciation, aa is asset price appreciation/depreciation, 
qr is the monetary returns derived from loans’ interest rates and qy; is the yield derived 
from fixed income securities (portfolio debt). 
To better understand how the different liquidity premia shape foreign investors’ portfolio 
decisions along boom-bust cycles, we bring in Minsky’s (1986) financial fragility 
hypothesis. He emphasises the inherent tendency over economic units to move from the 
IE-UFRJ DISCUSSION PAPER: PAULA; FRITZ; PRATES, TD 033 - 2020 18 
state of robustness to financial fragility over time, “due to shift in expectations that occurs 
over the course of a business cycle, and the way this shift is transmitted through the 
financial system” (Dymski and Pollin, 1992, p. 40). This behaviour results in the adoption 
of increasingly smaller safety margins, giving rise to a growing financial fragility in the 
economy. To cite Minsky’s (1982, p. 101) most well-known aphorism: “Stability – or 
tranquillity – in a world with a cyclical past and capitalist financial institutions is 
destabilising” (italics added).  
During booms of capital inflows – i.e. stability and tranquillity – in the international 
financial markets (most of them geared initially by an expansionary monetary policy in 
the United States), global investors’ preference for liquidity decreases, leading to a fall in 
the weight given to the liquidity premium differential and a rise in global investors’ 
demand for EMEs securities, associated with the favourable interest rate differential 
(bonds) or expectation of capital gains (equity) in local markets (see formula 3 above)6. 
This ‘search for yields’ results in an appreciation of the emerging currency, leading to an 
expectation of further appreciation (rise in a), which further increases the expected return 
differential, thus further stimulating capital inflows and reinforcing the currency 
appreciation.  
Two features of EMEs underlie these self-feeding interactions that increase the financial 
fragility over the boom and can lead to destabilising dynamics in the bust phase. First, 
these investors are more likely to be drawn to exchange rate returns that are greater for 
EMEs’ currencies due their higher volatility, stemming from their subordinated position 
in the currency hierarchy. Consequently, they tend to respond more quickly to a first 
exchange rate appreciation. Second, the demand from a few money managers is sufficient 
to trigger self-feeding interactions due to the already-mentioned financial asymmetry.  
Over the boom phase, the continuity of investors’ low liquidity preference leads to a 
sustained and gradual increase in the demand for EMEs assets and hence a gradual 
currency appreciation path. Conversely, over the bust phases, by virtue of changes in the 
 
6 For a formalisation of the relationship between liquidity preference and liquidity premium, see Ramos 
(2019). 
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monetary policy in the AEs and/or an increase in the international liquidity preference, 
sudden capital outflows trigger deflation of EMEs’ financial assets and an abrupt 
depreciation of EMEs’ currencies, which are the main victims of global investors’ ‘flight 
to quality’(Ramos, 2019; see also Paula et al., 2017). 
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4 The metamorphosis of external vulnerabilities: A 
balance sheet analysis 
This section aims to present stylised balance sheets of EMEs for the periods of both 
financial internationalisation and financial globalisation. This will allow us to 
systematically assess how these economies’ vulnerability to external financial shocks has 
changed over time (see Table A1 in the Annex for a summary).  
For this purpose, we consider the changes in the nature of cross-border financial flows 
involving EMEs that shape the profile of their net external position, as described in 
section 2. These changes stem from a set of factors – such as the level of financial 
liberalisation, the characteristics and degree of complexity of financial instruments, the 
actors involved, and the links between the domestic and international financial sectors – 
that create diverse transmission channels of external shocks. We will use the notion of 
subordinated financialisation and our extended concept of currency hierarchy to 
analytically distinguish the building up and the unfolding of external vulnerabilities (see 
section 3). Our use of balance sheets to grasp the metamorphosis of these vulnerabilities 
in EMEs is also inspired by Minsky’s framework for agents’ portfolio decisions and their 
balance sheets.  
 
4.1 Traditional vulnerability under conditions of financial 
internationalisation: Balance sheet effects from original sin  
During the period considered here (1970s-1980s), the term ‘emerging economies’ did not 
even exist, as developing countries (the dominant general term for peripheral countries 
then) adopted significant restrictions on capital flows in this period, except for FDI and 
external loans. Back then, external debt mainly entered in the form of syndicate loans of 
Northern universal banks operating in the Euromarket and FDI7, with floating interest 
 
7 For the sake of simplification, we only assess financial flows, and do not consider FDI. Against the 
neoclassical conception of households, here we distinguish between private households as wage earners 
without net financial richness, and investors who are net wealth owners. 
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rates, long maturity and being denominated in Northern currency ($N), i.e. USD (see 
arrow (1) in Figure 6 below). This phenomenon of foreign currency-denominated debt 
has been labelled as ‘original sin’ (Eichengreen et al., 2002), reflecting the inability of an 
economy to borrow abroad in one’s own currency. The borrowers could be Southern 
banks, which would pass on lending to domestic firms (often in Southern currency ($S), 
arrow (2)), but in some cases also in or denominated in N$, or they could be domestic 
firms directly (arrow (3)).   
As in Southern economies cS was high and constant in this period due to non-liberalised 
capital accounts, and aS was stable due to the dominance of fixed exchange rate regimes, 
international creditors’ motivation concentrated on the yield differential (qS –qN), which 
had to compensate the liquidity premium differential (lN – lS), whose weight given by 
them in their portfolio decisions decreased due to the lower liquidity preference during 
the boom.   
This first post-war capital flow cycle lost speed with mounting debt levels in developing 
countries, especially in Latin America, although the death knell came with the interest 
rate shock by the Fed in 1979, which led to an increase in qn. The subsequent rise in the 
liquidity preference of international creditors triggered a credit crunch in the syndicated 
loan markets. Sovereigns, domestic banks, state-owned and private firms came under 
liquidity stress, as a consequence of maturity mismatch from the shortening of lending 
terms, interest rate increases and the impact of currency devaluation.  
The key vulnerability to a global financial shock for countries tainted with ‘original sin’ 
is that the Southern central bank has a truncated capacity to act as a lender of last resort 
(LLR) for solvent domestic banks indebted in $N. While the central bank can act as an 
LLR for domestic financial institutions in its own currency – as pointed out by Bagehot’s 
(1873) seminal work (arrow (4)) – the central bank’s LLR capacity in $N is limited to its 
foreign reserves. This inability to handle $N-related liquidity problems triggers a shift 
from liquidity to solvency problems in the domestic financial and productive sectors.  
At the moment when the burden of external debt grows abruptly due to an external shock, 
the level of foreign exchange reserves may prove to be insufficient to maintain the balance 
of payments in equilibrium. This in turn may lead to exchange rate devaluation, i.e. a 
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currency crisis given the fix or semi-fix exchange rate regimes. Such a crisis is even more 
probable if illegal capital flights from Southern investors (arrow (5)) place additional 
pressure on these reserves. In the face of high uncertainty and cumulative devaluation 
expectations, the yield differential (qS – qN) is no longer sufficient to compensate the 
liquidity premium differential (lN – lS), whereby these Southern wealth owners also wish 
to switch to $N. 
Figure 6. Balance sheet of Southern country under financial internationalisation 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration, adapted from Nitsch (1999) and Bindseil (2004). 
Notes: LLR = Lender of last resort; blue: domestic transactions; red: cross-border transactions; arrow 
direction: creditor to debtor. 
 
4.2 Increased interconnectedness and new vulnerabilities under 
financial globalisation: ‘Original sin redux’ 
Most EMEs entered the 1990s opening their capital accounts (cS↓) for inflows and 
outflows, in a process that would gradually continue over the next two decades. This came 
together with a shift to flexible exchange rate in the 2000s, the second sub-period of 
financial globalisation. All three capital flow cycles of financial globalisation were driven 
by periods of low global interest rates. However, especially the third sub-period of 
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quantitative easing during the 2010s – and recently during the COVID-19 crisis – 
launched an intensified global ‘search for yield’. 
The interconnectedness with international financial markets has become much more 
intensive, diverse and complex (see Figure 7 below). The share of cross-border activities 
increased with the emergence of new agents and diversified and complex financial 
instruments such as derivatives, especially from the 2000s onwards.8 All kinds of wealth 
owners (i.e. institutional investors or money managers, from pension funds to hedge 
funds) emerged in Northern as well as Southern countries, and Southern treasuries entered 
the field as borrowers with cross-border links with these investors.  
During boom periods of international capital flows to EMEs, the Southern firm has 
continued to borrow in $N$ from Northern banks (arrow (1)), and partially also from 
banks in their own country (arrow (2)). This is the same pattern as during financial 
internationalisation, albeit at a higher level, especially during the latest sub-period, due to 
a record-low qrN. New to this period is the issuing of securities by Southern banks and 
firms (in $N in the international capital market and in $S or $N in the domestic market, 
arrow (6)). Moreover, the Southern firm has become financialised (Bonizzi et al., 2019), 
investing in financial assets in $N and $S (arrows (8) and (10)). As a result, the typical 
Southern firm has seen the two sides of its balance sheet boosted during the tranquillity 
phase: the asset price inflation would increase the value of its assets (aaN↑; and aaS↑; see 
formula (3) in section 3). This would enhance its capacity of borrowing in N$ and S$, 
hence pushing up the value of its liabilities.   
The idealised Northern investor has invested in EMEs in securities in $N and $S in the 
international and domestic financial markets (arrow (6)). Moreover, it receives 
investment from Southern investors (arrow (7)) and Southern firms (arrow (8)) both in 
 
8 The balance sheet analysis in this section supposes an emerging economy with full capital account 
openness and permission for domestic financial transactions in (or denominated in) $N. For the sake of 
simplicity, it only includes transactions in spot markets, thus excluding derivatives, for example. 
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$N. The Southern treasury has issued bonds in $N, and increasingly also in $S, both to 
be increasingly held by international investors (arrow (9)).   
While busts of capital flows to EMEs are often associated with a qrN↑, the global financial 
crisis – and especially the latest bust of the COVID-19 global shock – were triggered by 
a radical increase in uncertainty, resulting in a sharp rise in the liquidity preference of 
Northern agents and the weight given to the liquidity premium differential (lN - lS). When 
looking at the more recent bust periods – and especially the COVID-19 sudden stop – we 
detect a much more complex pattern of balance sheet effects.   
For cross-border debt in $N, we essentially detect the same kind of negative balance sheet 
effects due to ‘original sin’ and the limited capacity of the Southern central bank to act as 
an LLR (arrow (4)) as in the period of financial internationalisation. Again, Southern 
debtors in $N suffer from the problem of debt revaluation expressed in Southern currency 
due to currency depreciation, which eventually leads to a situation of insolvency. 
However, the level of complexity attached to these negative balance sheet effects has 
significantly increased. While these were previously limited to Northern banks and 
Southern banks and firms indebted in $N, now they affect nearly all sectors of the 
Southern economy, including the public sector. This new complexity of currency 
mismatches creates liquidity problems all over the economy and further reinforces 
currency depreciation and financial instability in the case of a sudden stop. Economic 
literature started to grasp the nature and explosive implications of this kind of balance 
mismatches after the series of financial crises in EMEs in Asia and Latin America (i.e. 
Calvo et al., 2004).  
 
IE-UFRJ DISCUSSION PAPER: PAULA; FRITZ; PRATES, TD 033 - 2020 25 
Figure 7. Balance sheet of Southern country under financial globalisation 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration loosely inspired on Bindseil (2004) and Nitsch (1999) 
Notes: LLR = lender of last resort; blue: domestic transactions; red: cross-border transactions; arrow 
direction: creditor to debtor. 
 
In view of this, the increased investment of global investors in securities in $S appears to 
be very good news, as it shifts the balance sheet effects of a currency depreciation from 
Southern borrowers to Northern creditors. Consequently, EMEs’ exposure to this kind of 
external vulnerability declines. The Southern treasury, for example, remains isolated from 
the direct effects of a currency depreciation when its bonds in $S are held by global 
investors, with the latter recording losses, measured in $N.  
However, this new pattern of EMEs’ liabilities held by global investors creates new 
channels of transmission of financial shocks, and with this a new source of external 
vulnerability. To date, such a new phenomenon has remained rather unperceived in 
academic work and policy guidance, to our knowledge.  
‘Original sin redux’ is the term coined by economists of the Bank for International 
Settlement (BIS) (Carsten and Shin, 2019; Hofmann et al., 2020) to grasp this new type 
of vulnerability. The authors stress that as foreign investors have assets in EMEs’ 
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currencies but obligations to beneficiaries in their own currency ($N), an EME’s currency 
depreciation might trigger sales of EMEs’ bonds and equity.  
“The exchange rate plays an important amplifying role in the portfolio 
adjustment of global investors [lending in EMEs currencies] (…). In this 
context, a generalized EME currency depreciation further lowers the value of 
assets in the foreign investors’ home currency terms, tightening their risk 
constraints more than otherwise. When risk capacity is limited, EME currency 
depreciation may trigger sales or ex post hedging, pushing up EME bond 
spreads due to the exit of foreign investors” (Hofmann et al., 2020, p. 2). 
 
Thus, even if Northern investors have to bear the direct costs of an acS decrease, their 
reaction will trigger self-feeding interactions in the opposite direction to that observed in 
the boom phase (see section 3), i.e. further capital outflows to cover prior losses, 
reinforcing acS devaluation. The reaction to these effects due to ‘original sin redux’ will 
thus increase the balance sheet effects linked to the ‘original sin’ of Southern debtors in 
$N.  
This multiplied herding behaviour of investors who originally invested in different 
currencies and assets but reacted to shocks in the same direction augments the volatility 
of capital flows and EME exchange rates and financial asset prices, therefore influencing 
the transfers of wealth between EMEs and AEs. While for specific agents the net costs 
will depend on a series of variables such as the ratio of debt held in $S to that in $N and 
the net effects of asset price changes on the share of each currency on his/her asset and 
liability sides, for the EME economy as a whole the result is augmented capital flow and 
exchange rate volatility, with all of its damaging effects for growth, employment and 
productive investment.  
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5 Conclusion  
In this paper, we have asked how new patterns of capital flows and cross-border stocks 
under financialisation and financial globalisation influence the external vulnerability of 
EMEs, considering their subordinated form of integration in global financial markets. We 
departed from the Keynesian-structuralist idea of an asymmetric configuration of the 
global monetary system, formalised in a concept of currency hierarchy that is shaped by 
the difference in the liquidity premia attributed to currencies of the centre (Northern) and 
peripheral (Southern) countries. We then extended this formal concept to theoretically 
grasp the increased relevance of portfolio flows and global investment in EMEs’ 
currencies that we identify.  
Our balance sheet analysis inspired by Minsky’s framework is based on an idealised 
EME, with its capital account nowadays fully open to all kinds of financial operations by 
domestic and international agents in the period of financial globalisation. This allows us 
to systematically assess the metamorphosis of these vulnerabilities. For the period of 
financial internationalisation, we identify as the main vulnerability the negative effects of 
the so-called ‘original sin’ in the balance sheet of Southern agents indebted in Northern 
currency. The resulting currency mismatch leads to a revaluation of their debt in domestic 
currency in the case of an external shock with a currency devaluation. On the one hand, 
‘original sin’ effects have augmented in the period of financial globalisation, with 
increased debt volumes and financial sophistication.   
On the other hand, these effects of ‘original sin’ have not been eradicated, but contained 
by increasing global investment also in securities denominated in EMEs’ currencies. 
Indeed, due to having liabilities in Northern currencies and assets in Northern and 
Southern currencies, now Northern investors’ balance sheets are tainted by potential 
currency mismatches. Here, it is those investors who suffer the losses from EMEs’ 
currency depreciation. These will be greater, the longer the period of tranquillity and 
build-up of financial fragility. In theory, this should thus reduce EMEs’ external 
vulnerability. However, what we found is that this has created new sources of external 
vulnerability, which economists from the BIS recently labelled as ‘original sin redux’.  
IE-UFRJ DISCUSSION PAPER: PAULA; FRITZ; PRATES, TD 033 - 2020 28 
This also helps us to better grasp the new and complex vulnerabilities of EMEs that the 
current COVID-19 crisis has brought to light. Radical uncertainty in the first weeks – and 
with this a sharp increase in the liquidity preference of global investors – led to an 
unprecedented sudden stop and capital outflow of EMEs, followed by a quick – even if 
partial and selective – rebounding of capital flows, linked to aggressive quantitative 
easing in the North and the subsequent decline in the liquidity preference at the 
international level.  
Our explanation based on our balance sheet analysis is twofold: first, the wave of new 
debt accumulation in the latest sub-period of financial globalisation – together with new 
investment strategies such as the benchmark-driven management of EMEs funds – further 
increased problems of ‘original sin’ and with it global investors’ herding behaviour. 
Second, ‘original sin redux’ further pushed capital outflows, as international investors 
were running from dropping asset prices in Southern domestic financial markets, exerting 
even stronger pressure on EMEs’ exchange rates. However, when asset prices reached 
record lows, these investors with their recovered hunger for yields gradually returned to 
investing in EMEs’ assets denominated in both Northern and Southern currencies.  
The new pattern of vulnerabilities has thus created an unprecedented level of complexity, 
where it becomes more and more difficult to foresee gains and losses for agents in global 
markets in periods of global turmoil, and where reactions to shocks turn increasingly 
brusque, exposing EMEs to ever higher volatility of capital flows and exchange rate 
variations, with all of its damaging effects for growth and sustainable development.  
In terms of policy lessons, this brings two issues to the table: first, concerning which 
indicators policy-makers need to grasp these new complex vulnerabilities; and second, 
the necessity of containing the adverse impacts of financial globalisation, with 
instruments such as comprehensive capital account regulation.  
With our contribution, we also seek to open up new fields for research. This may be 
quantitative analysis to better grasp the effects of ‘original sin redux’.Also, there are 
relevant differences among EMEs regarding their form of subordinated integration into 
global financial markets, which have been disregarded here but are highly relevant, and 
which require careful case studies to access the relative weight of the old and new external 
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vulnerabilities and their entanglement. Finally, the idealised balance sheets that we have 
presented here might serve as an analytical tool for the new complex distribution of gains 
and losses across borders and the resulting wealth transfers, as well as their cumulative 
effects for EMEs in periods of global turmoil. 
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Table A1. Phases of the metamorphosis of external vulnerabilities 
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Stage of financial 
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Balance sheet 
effects 
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